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SECTOR-SPECIFIC COMPETITION
ENFORCEMENT AT THE FCC
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) charge to
promote the public interest in the communications sector encom-
passes a mandate to foster competition.1 The FCC is far from the
only federal agency with an interest in competitive communications
markets. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the nation’s generalist
antitrust enforcers, also seek to ensure that communications mar-
kets (as well as all other industries) perform competitively. These
Remarks explain how and why sector-specific enforcement by the
FCC complements generalist competition enforcement to the bene-
fit of competition in the communications industry. These Remarks
also discuss the ways in which a sector-specific agency such as the
FCC can foster competition and promote other public goals, and
compare merger reviews by the DOJ and the FCC in the wake of the
1996 Telecommunications Act.2
One might expect to see little difference in how the competi-
tive effects of mergers are analyzed at the FCC versus the DOJ and
the FTC. After all, the economists at these agencies have similar
training and think about industrial organization economics in the
same way. Indeed, some FCC economists have previously worked at
* Chief Economist, Federal Communications Commission (FCC); Professor
of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. The views expressed are
not necessarily those of the FCC. The Author has previously served in front office
positions at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (as Director of the Bureau of
Economics) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) (as
Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics), but his
views are not necessarily those of those agencies. The Author is indebted to Stuart
Benjamin, Jim Bird, Joel Rabinovitz, and Austin Schlick for helpful conversations
and comments.
1. Recent FCC merger decisions, for example, routinely recite: “Our public
interest evaluation necessarily encompasses the broad aims of the Communica-
tions Act, which include, among other things, a deeply rooted preference for pre-
serving and enhancing competition in relevant markets . . . .” Applications Filed
for the Transfer of Certain Spectrum Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations in
the States of Me., N. H., and Vt. from Verizon Commc’ns Inc. and its Subsidiaries
to FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc., 23 FCC Rcd. 514 para. 12 (2008) (internal quotations
omitted).
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
413
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the antitrust enforcement agencies, and vice versa. Moreover, the
FCC often looks to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines promulgated
by the DOJ and the FTC for guidance in analyzing horizontal merg-
ers. For this reason, among others, some commentators claim that
it is unnecessary and wasteful for multiple agencies to review com-
munications industry mergers; these commentators typically recom-
mend that the FCC defer to the antitrust enforcement agencies.3
This view downplays the benefits of concurrent jurisdiction over
competition questions.
The competition enforcers and the FCC do not necessarily see
every proposed merger identically for a number of reasons unre-
lated to their similar approaches to analyzing the economic effects
of a transaction. First, the agencies differ in the scope of their re-
view. Both the FCC and the antitrust enforcers consider competi-
tion, but the FCC is also concerned with other public interest goals,
such as protecting service quality for consumers of interstate tele-
communications services, accelerating the private sector deploy-
ment of advanced telecommunications services, and ensuring that a
diversity of information sources and viewpoints are available to the
public.4
Second, the agencies differ in focus. Though the antitrust en-
forcers learn in some depth about some industries in which investi-
gations recur (including some aspects of communications markets),
they emphasize competitive analysis. The FCC focuses on communi-
cations, though it also frequently analyzes competition questions.5
3. See, e.g., JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSS-
ROADS: AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 426 (2005)
(“It is debateable whether the public interest demands these additional, largely
unchecked layers of intervention [from the FCC’s independent merger review]
beyond the basic inquiries already conducted by the Justice Department or FTC—
inquiries that are considered more than adequate for other industries.”).
4. E.g., Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM
Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., transferor to Sirius Satelline Radio Inc., Transferee,
23 FCC Rcd. 12348 para. 31 (2008) (XM-Sirius Order) (describing elements of
FCC’s public interest evaluation of proposed mergers).
5. The difference in focus may be connected to a procedural difference
among the agencies. The FCC must review every merger within the communica-
tions industries, as parties cannot consummate a transaction without FCC ap-
proval. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2006) (forbidding license transfers unless FCC
finds “that the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served thereby”).
By contrast, the antitrust enforcement agencies have discretion over which merg-
ers to investigate, are notified only as to the largest transactions before consumma-
tion, and have prosecutorial discretion to focus their resources on the transactions
raising the greatest competitive concern. See generally ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E.
KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS
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Third, the agencies differ in the statutory allocation of the bur-
den of proof. The antitrust enforcers must ultimately prove harm to
competition to a court (though nearly all transactions that raise
concerns to the DOJ or the FTC are either remedied through settle-
ment or abandoned by the parties).6  By contrast, merging firms
must prove to the FCC that their proposed transaction is in the
public interest,7 and the proposed transaction is subject to appel-
late review8 (though nearly all concerns about acquisitions at the
FCC are resolved by imposing conditions on the merged firm).9
Fourth, the agencies differ in how they collect and test evi-
dence.10 The antitrust enforcement agencies do so proactively in
order to prepare for possible litigation. For example, these agencies
may interview customers or depose executives from the merging
firms. The FCC reviews information obtained directly from the par-
ties, but tends to rely more than the antitrust agencies on voluntary
submissions by third parties and its own expertise to test the evi-
dence proffered by the merging firms.11
Fifth, the agencies differ in their culture. The antitrust enforc-
ers, wary of ongoing supervision of merged firms, are more skepti-
cal of conduct relief and more inclined toward structural relief than
the FCC,12 which has an ongoing interaction with all sectors of the
communications industry. That ongoing interaction could in theory
raise the risk that the sector-specific agency would be “captured” by
the regulated industry, leading the agency to act to favor the inter-
ests of the industry rather than the public interest.13 But a sector-
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 474–78 (2d ed. 2008) (describing U.S.
merger enforcement process).
6. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 5, at 474–78.
7. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2006).
8. Id. § 402(b).
9. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 2007 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 1333 (2008).
10. This difference between the antitrust agencies and the FCC resembles a
difference between U.S. enforcement agencies and the European Commission’s
Directorate General for Competition. See Jonathan B. Baker, My Summer Vacation at
the European Commission, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Sept. 2005, available at http://
www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/05/09/Sep05-Baker9=27.pdf.
11. Congress set up the FCC’s merger review process to ensure greater trans-
parency and public participation than normally occurs with the process at the anti-
trust enforcement agencies, at the cost of leaving the FCC with greater difficulty
obtaining confidential business information relevant to merger review.
12. E.g., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to
Merger Remedies, 7–9 (Oct. 2004), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guide-
lines/205108.pdf.
13. In a strict sense, agency capture requires that regulators expect, perhaps
only with probability, to be rewarded with political support or future employment
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specific agency can counteract a possible tendency toward system-
atic bias in favor of relying on evidence provided by the regulated
firms. For example, the sector-specific agency may take internal
steps to test evidence that are analogous to the kind of discipline
the adversarial process imposes on the antitrust agencies, as with
FCC Chairman Genachowski’s emphasis on transparent, fact-based,
and data-driven decisionmaking processes.14
Moreover, there are benefits from placing competition review
in a sector-specific agency such as the FCC. The FCC has an advan-
tage over the generalist antitrust agencies in fostering competition
in communication markets because of the FCC’s industry expertise
and broad public interest mandate. These give the FCC the practi-
cal ability to take a longer view of the evolution of the industry than
is possible for the antitrust agencies.15 In addition, the FCC can
address potential competition issues more easily than the competi-
tion enforcers can because of the hurdles the antitrust agencies
at a regulated firm for decisions favoring the regulated industry relative to how the
polity would prefer it to act. Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267, 269–70 (Peter Newman
ed., 1998). The term is also used more broadly to encompass all regulatory deci-
sions that favor the interests of regulated firms relative to the public interest re-
gardless of whether the decisions were adopted by regulators anticipating some
reward, and that usage is adopted here. See, e.g., Theodore E. Keeler & Stephen E.
Foreman, Regulation and Deregulation, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECO-
NOMICS AND THE LAW, supra, at 213–14. In a psychological sense, it may be natural
for staff working only on matters involving one industry to see that industry as
important, to identify with it, and to want the firms and their business experiments
to succeed. Moreover, when it is costly for the sector-specific agency to learn about
the regulated industry, the information on which agency decisions are based may
become systematically biased toward what is provided by the regulated firms, lead-
ing staff to see issues the way the regulated firms do. In addition, if the political
branches of government prefer the interests of regulated industries to what would
be desired by the polity as a whole, those branches may use their supervisory
levers—appointments, budget, legislation, and oversight hearings—to encourage
sector-specific regulators to share their viewpoint.
14. E.g., Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Preserving
a Free and Open Internet: A Platform for Innovation, Opportunity, and Prosperity
(Sept. 21, 2009), available at http://www.openinternet.gov/read-speech.html (“I
will ensure that the rulemaking process will be fair, transparent, fact-based, and
data-driven.”).
15. Cf. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM
Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.,transferor to Sirius Satelline Radio Inc., Transferee,
23 FCC Rcd. 12348 para. 32 (2008) (XM-Sirius Order) (“The Commission’s com-
petitive analysis under the public interest standard is somewhat broader [than that
undertaken by DOJ pursuant to the Clayton Act] . . . and takes a more expansive
view of potential and future competition and its impact on the relevant market.”).
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face in proving a potential competition case in court.16  These FCC
advantages were evident in the way the agencies addressed the pos-
sibility of telephone industry mergers in the immediate wake of the
1996 Telecommunications Act.17 At that time, the FCC took a
longer view than the DOJ and considered potential competition is-
sues to the benefit of competition generally.
A year after the legislation, AT&T, which was then a long dis-
tance company, floated the idea of merging with SBC, a large local
telephone service provider and one of the regional Bell operating
companies.18 From a purely competition perspective, even in 1997,
this was a colorable possibility. Local and long distance telephone
service are complements, not substitutes, and in general the anti-
trust scrutiny of mergers among sellers of complements is more re-
laxed than when the merger is horizontal (that is, among sellers of
substitutes).19 Moreover, the 1996 Act had specified a path for local
telephone service providers to enter long distance service,20 sug-
gesting that Congress recognized the benefits of allowing providers
to achieve scope economies in providing both services. The same
legislative provisions also suggested that Congress believed that
those benefits might outweigh the threat that a regulated local ser-
vice provider, affiliated after merger with an unregulated long dis-
tance provider, could game the system to exercise market power.21
In consequence, it is possible to imagine that in 1997, an antitrust
agency would have concluded on balance that competition would
be enhanced by a merger between AT&T and SBC.
By contrast, the FCC, the expert communications agency, had
a vision of how the communications industry should evolve. The
FCC aimed in 1997 to effectuate the central thrust of the 1996 Act
16. See 2007 REV. ANTITRUST L. DEV., supra note 9, at 371–79 (describing ele-
ments government must prove to demonstrate harm to competition under “per-
ceived potential competition” theory and “actual potential competition” theory);
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE § 13.4 (3d ed. 2005) (same).
17. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
18. Mark Landler, AT&T Is Said to Break Off Merger Talks with SBC, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1997, at 35 (recounting history of merger talks).
19. See Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at § 9.4, at 392 (“Prevailing judicial opin-
ion now seems to be that vertical mergers should be condemned only in the most
extreme circumstances.”).
20. 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
21. The merged firm might harm competition in the unregulated service by
shifting common costs to the regulated service or by impeding or raising costs of
interconnection to rivals in the unregulated service; competition problems such as
these had led to the Bell System breakup.
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by developing markets that would become so competitive as to per-
mit deregulation to the extent possible.22 In that vision there was
no place for doing what the merger threatened in part to do: re-
create the dangers presented by the old AT&T, which had been
broken up more than a dozen years before.
The FCC at that time saw the long distance companies, particu-
larly AT&T (the largest one), as important potential rivals for pro-
viding local telephone service; and they saw the local telephone
companies as important potential rivals for the long distance com-
panies.23 The FCC’s Chairman responded to the idea of an AT&T
merger with SBC by declaring that the hypothetical AT&T merger
was “unthinkable.”24 As a result the merger did not happen for
eight more years—until the industry had evolved to the point
where the only concerns that the FCC and the DOJ had in their
merger reviews related to the effect of the transaction on certain
lines and services provided mainly to local business customers in
some locations.25
Bell Atlantic and NYNEX, two large local service providers
(and former Bell system companies) had proposed a merger that
was pending when AT&T suggested merging with SBC. In 1997, the
FCC found that this merger would harm competition and secured
relief.26 Several months earlier, by contrast, the DOJ had allowed it
to proceed without challenge.27
The FCC was concerned that the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger
would mean the loss of potential competition to NYNEX in provid-
ing local phone service, particularly in New York City.28 The Com-
mission found that Bell Atlantic was one of four significant
potential rivals to NYNEX in NYNEX’s local service area, and that
22. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN, HOWARD SHELANSKI &
PHILLIP J. WEISER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW & POLICY 772 (2d ed. 2006);
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 3, at 69–74.
23. Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Thinking About
Why Some Communications Mergers are Unthinkable (June 19, 1997), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh735.html.
24. Id.
25. See Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. SBC Commc’ns Inc.,
No.: 1:05CV02102 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
cases/f213000/213026.htm; SBC Commc’ns Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for
Approval of Transfer of Control, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,290 para. 40 (2005).
26. NYNEX Corp., 12 FCC Rcd. 19,985 paras. 144–45, 168 (1997).
27. Press Release, Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, Statement Regarding Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX Merger (Apr. 24, 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/press_releases/1997/1113.htm. This transaction created the firm now
known as Verizon.
28. NYNEX Corp, 12 FCC Rcd. para. 44.
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Bell Atlantic was actually planning to enter New York from its adja-
cent territory in New Jersey.29 The other three significant potential
rivals were the large long distance providers (AT&T, Sprint, and
MCI), but the FCC found that among these four potential competi-
tors, Bell Atlantic was particularly well positioned to succeed after
entry.30 The Commission concluded that the loss of Bell Atlantic as
a potential rival would remove an important competitive restraint
on NYNEX.31
The FCC considered and rejected the efficiency arguments
that the merging firms proffered in favor of the transaction, mainly
on the ground that the efficiencies were not merger-specific.32 The
Commission resolved its concerns about the loss of potential com-
petition by imposing conditions that were intended to encourage
entry by even more distant potential rivals, for example, by requir-
ing the merged firm to sell unbundled network elements at for-
ward-looking cost.33
The DOJ came out differently and declined to sue, declaring
that it did not believe the merger violated the antitrust laws.34 The
DOJ statement did not provide a detailed explanation of its reason-
ing, consistent with the usual practice when an antitrust agency de-
clines to sue, but the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
Economics later suggested that the three long distance companies
were roughly as good potential rivals as Bell Atlantic, and that three
potential competitors were probably enough to protect competi-
tion.35 Moreover, the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Di-
vision explained that he resolved this “difficult case” against
challenging the merger on the basis that “on balance the merger
29. See id. paras. 20, 44, 73.
30. Id. paras. 105–08.
31. Id. para. 102.
32. Id. para. 168.
33. Id. paras. 13–14. Consistent with the sector-specific agency’s vision of de-
veloping more competitive communications markets, the FCC held that it in order
to find the transaction in the public interest on competition grounds, the Commis-
sion needed to be convinced that the merger “will enhance competition.” Id. para.
2.
34. Press Release, Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, supra note 27.
35. Andrew S. Joskow, Potential Competition: The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger, 16
REV. INDUS. ORG. 185, 188 (2000). For a discussion of “legitimate economic theo-
ries of potentially exclusionary effects of a merger between geographically non-
overlapping incumbents,” see Marius Schwartz, Discussant Comments on Papers by
Andrew Joskow, Daniel Rubinfeld, and Janusz Ordover and Margaret Guerin-Calvert, 16
REV. INDUS. ORG. 219, 220–22 (2000).
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was likely to benefit consumers in that the resulting efficiencies
would lead to improved services.”36
One interpretation of the different outcomes is that the two
agencies simply disagreed about whether the remaining potential
competitors provided a sufficient competitive constraint and on
how seriously to take the efficiency claims. But when disagreements
between the DOJ or the FTC and an industry regulator occur, it is
unusual to observe the sector-specific agency acting more aggres-
sively to protect competition than the antitrust agency, so it may be
that the DOJ’s analysis of the facts was colored by the practical diffi-
culty an antitrust enforcement agency would face in overcoming
the legal hurdles involved in proving a potential competition case
to a federal judge.37
This story illustrates the importance to competition policy of
concurrent merger review by a competition enforcement agency
alongside a sector-specific agency. In examining telephone industry
mergers after the 1996 Act, concurrent review added to competi-
tion enforcement; its benefit was not simply from the ability of the
expert agency to consider important non-competition public inter-
est goals. The sector-specific agency has the expertise and ability to
take a longer view of how the industry should evolve, allowing it to
identify and address competitive issues that go beyond the practical
ambit of antitrust enforcement. By drawing on the strengths of the
sector-specific agency and the competition agency, concurrent re-
view can thus enhance competition enforcement as a whole.
36. Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of Justice, The Im-
portance of Antitrust Enforcement in the New Economy (Jan. 29, 1998), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/1338.htm.
37. In discussing the Justice Department’s review of the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX
merger, the former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics hints at such
a concern. Joskow, supra note 35, at 188–89. Cf. NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra
note 3, at 424 (“[A]ntitrust authorities may block mergers to protect ‘potential’
competition only in the narrowest of circumstances.”).
